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Abstract
This paper contributes to the analysis of mergers in two-sided markets, notably those in which
a platform provides its service for free on one side but obtains all its revenues from the other,
as in the digital TV industry. Specifically, we assess a decision of the French competition
authority which approved the merger of the broadcasting services of the TV channels involved
but imposed a behavioral remedy prohibiting the merger of their respective advertising sales
services. To do so, we build a structural model allowing for multi-homing of advertisers and,
using a comprehensive dataset, we estimate the demand of viewers and advertisers. Our
evaluation provides evidence that the remedy has been ineffective at limiting the increase
in prices and amounts of advertising, due to the cross-side externalities between viewers and
advertisers. Without resulting in significant positive effects on the viewers' surplus, the remedy
has also drastically increased the advertisers' total cost. Nevertheless, the remedy has benefited
the competitors of the merging channels. The main lesson of our analysis is that, in the process
of designing competition or regulatory policy for two-sided markets, ignoring the interaction
between the two sides of platforms can result in unexpected outcomes.
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1 Introduction
Competition authorities have been particularly concerned in recent years by the behavior of dom-
inant firms in two-sided markets, which provide services on one side but generate revenues on the
other, in a way that could harm the interest of consumers.1 In the internet industry, users search
the web free of charge, but trigger advertisements which generate revenues for the firms that supply
the search engines. Similarly, in the digital TV market, when viewers watch a program for free,
they receive a flow of advertisements that generate revenues for the TV channels. Dominant firms
in these markets often provide better services than their rivals without charging an extra monetary
price to their users. In this way, the dominant firms attract more users, which, in turn, increases
their attractiveness in the advertising market. While consumers enjoy a free service from these
firms, they may be overwhelmed by the amount of advertising. This can be even more problematic
when the dominant media companies get bigger by acquiring smaller competitors. On the one
hand, the dominant firms can offer better services by expanding their customer base, which allows
them to show more advertisements (as a non-monetary price) to their users. On the other hand,
the acquisition can increase the market power of the merging firms in the TV advertising market,
which allows them to charge higher prices to the advertisers.
This paper studies this situation by providing a structural analysis of the acquisition of two
new entrants in the French digital TV market, namely, channels NT1 and TMC, by a big media
holding company, the TF1 Group. We observe a unique situation in which the French competition
authority approved the merger of the broadcasting services of the two purchased channels with
those of the acquiring company but blocked the merger of their advertising sales houses (ASHs
herein).2 In practice, the competition authority imposed a behavioral remedy which requires that
the ASH of NT1 and TMC remain separate from that of the main channel of the TF1 Group,
namely, channel TF1.3 In this decision, the authority wished to improve the broadcasting quality
of the two purchased channels without generating detrimental effects for the advertising market.4
To this end, it expected to enhance competition for viewers among TV broadcasters without
reducing competition in the TV advertising market.
While the competition authority's examinations of both the broadcasting and advertising sides
of the market were straightforward, its decision nevertheless treated the channels' advertising
services separately from their broadcasting services. We show in this paper that ignoring the
interaction between the two sides of the market can result in unexpected outcomes.
Using a comprehensive dataset on the French digital TV market, covering two years of the
pre-acquisition period and three years of the post-acquisition period, we first provide reduced-
form evidence that the French TV market is a two-sided market. In other words, we show that
cross-side network externalities between viewers and advertisers do exist. Based on the assumption
that TV channels are two-sided platforms, we then build a structural model which describes the
demand functions of TV viewers and advertisers as well as the objective of the ASHs.
TV viewers' preferences between different channels are approximated by a nested logit model.
Thanks to data about the genres of broadcasting content, we take care to solve the endogeneity
issues related to this type of model. Our estimates of demand elasticities with respect to the
amount of advertising indicate a median loss of audience of about 8.7 percent in response to a
10 percent increase in advertising time, suggesting that the negative externalities that advertisers
1See for instance the European Commission decision, in March 2019, to fine Google 1.49 billion euros for abusive
practices in online advertising.
2An ASH handles and sells the advertising time available on the TV stations that it works for.
3Note that the advertising time of channels NT1 and TMC were already managed by one common ASH before
the TF1 Group had acquired these two channels.
4More details about the merger decision are provided in Section 5 of the paper.
2
generate for TV viewers are relatively large.
Our novel approach to model the demand of advertisers considers their multi-homing behavior
and allows us to estimate, using aggregated advertising data, whether a channel is a substitute
or complement to another channel for advertisers.5 In more detail, we model the advertisers'
objective as one that minimizes the total advertising costs which generate the desired audience,
and estimate the advertisers' cost function approximated by a translog model. We find that the
advertisers consider the two purchased channels (NT1 and TMC) as substitutes, but both as
complements of channel TF1. This demand pattern of advertisers implies that merging the ASHs
of the three channels would not result in a significant increase in the price of advertising.
Based on the estimates of the model parameters, we evaluate the consequences of the acquisi-
tion. Using post-acquisition data, we first show that the broadcasting quality of the two purchased
channels has increased, but the ASHs reacted to the changes in the broadcasting quality of TV
channels by adjusting their amounts (and hence the prices) of advertising. By counterfactual sim-
ulation, we then show the following: i) in the absence of the negative externalities that advertisers
generate for viewers, the ASHs respond to the increase in willingness of advertisers to pay for the
advertising slots of the merging channels (as a result of the increase in their broadcasting quality
and therefore their viewership) by restricting their total amounts of advertising slots and thereby
increasing their prices; ii) the two-sided network externalities between viewers and advertisers fur-
ther incentivize the ASHs to increase the amount of advertising on the merging channels following
the increase in their broadcasting quality since viewers are less sensitive to the amount of adver-
tising during programs of better quality; iii) the joint effect of the changes in broadcasting quality
and the two-sided network externalities results in an increase in both the amounts and prices of
advertising of the merging channels.
To gain an insight into the potential consequences of merging the ASHs of the three channels,
we simulate the equilibrium amount of advertising and its price in the case in which the advertising
time of NT1, TMC and TF1 is chosen and sold by one common ASH. We show that merging the
ASHs of the three channels would only slightly increase their total advertising, due to the small
substitution effect of advertising on the viewers' side, and would have almost no impact on the
price of advertising, since the slots of the two merged ASHs are complements for advertisers. A
welfare analysis further suggests that blocking the merger of the ASHs of the three channels did not
have a significant positive effect on the surplus of TV viewers, but has increased advertisers' total
advertising cost. At the same time, we note that the behavioral remedy has benefited the ASHs of
TF1 Group's competitors by avoiding an important shift of the total advertising profits from the
non-merging ASHs to the merging ones. On the basis of European competition law, the French
competition authority should have approved the merger of the ASHs of the three channels, since
the consumer surplus remained almost unchanged. However, in the political debate, a decision
about whether to approve this merger could be determined according to the weights that the people
allocate to the different market players. In any case, the two-sided nature of the market should
not be ignored when examining the merger.
This paper first contributes to the relatively limited empirical literature on two-sided markets.
Beginning with the seminal articles of Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006), theoretical
papers have addressed TV advertising competition by considering the amount of advertising as
a nuisance to TV viewers (e.g., Anderson and Coate, 2005; Cunningham and Alexander, 2004;
Nilssen and Sørgard, 2000). In practice, very few empirical papers have estimated viewers' demand
elasticities with respect to the amount of advertising. Wilbur (2008) finds TV viewers dislike
advertising. A similar attitude of viewers towards advertising has also been found in the radio and
5We thank the Editor for pointing out the issue of the substitutability between channels for the advertisers.
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newspaper industries. (See Jeziorski, 2014; Ivaldi and Muller, 2018.) However, empirical studies
have also found audiences appreciating advertising in yellow pages and magazines. (See Rysman,
2004; Kaiser and Wright, 2006; Ivaldi and Muller, 2018.) Here, identifying the sign of the network
externalities that the advertisers generate for viewers is crucial, as it impacts the strategic behavior
of the ASHs in the advertising market. If viewers dislike advertising and switch channels during
the advertisements, the ASHs would restrict the amount of advertising on TV to avoid losing
viewers, but would increase the amount of advertising on a TV channel following an increase in its
broadcasting quality. In our estimates, we find a statistically significant disutility of advertising
to TV viewers.
This paper also contributes to the extensive literature on mergers. Post-merger analysis has
been adopted to evaluate the effectiveness of competition policy in numerous industries, such as air-
lines (Borenstein, 1990; Kim and Singal, 1993), banking (Facacelli and Panetta, 2003), petroleum
(Hastings, 2004; Gilbert and Hastings, 2005; Hosken, Silvia, and Taylor, 2011), and appliances
(Ashenfelter, Hosken, and Weinberg, 2013). Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) assess mergers in five
different branded-goods industries. Björnerstedt and Verboven (2015) evaluate the performance of
merger simulations in the Swedish analgesics market. In line with the previous literature, we eval-
uate the ex-post consequences of an approved acquisition under behavioral remedy in the digital
TV market. Our structural analysis is also related to another branch of the merger literature that
quantifies the welfare effects of mergers. Examples of such articles include Baker and Bresnahan
(1985), Hausman et al. (1994), Werden and Froeb (1994), and Nevo (2000), among others.
More recent literature is interested in the effects of mergers in two-sided media markets, and
in particular on the product positioning that Sweeting (2010) has initially studied in detail in the
context of the radio industry. Fan (2013) simulates the potential consequences of a merger pro-
hibited by the Department of Justice in the US newspaper industry. She develops a model which
endogenizes the choice of characteristics and shows that ignoring adjustments of product charac-
teristics causes substantial differences in estimated effects of mergers. Jeziorski (2014) evaluates
the ex-post welfare effects of mergers in the US radio market. In particular, he decomposes the
changes in consumer surplus into product repositioning effects and advertising quantity readjust-
ment effects. He shows that the product repositioning effect of a merger improves listeners' surplus
but the resulting advertising readjustment reduces it. Our data are not sufficiently disaggregated
to allow us to study the repositioning of products after the merger. However, we show the key
role of the quality of broadcasting services alongside that of two-sided network externalities in
determining the magnitude of the impact of the merger in our study.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the French digital
TV market. In Section 3, we model the demand of TV viewers and of advertisers. The demand
estimates are presented in Section 4. We carry out the merger evaluation in Section 5 and conclude
in Section 6.
2 The French digital TV market
2.1 Data
The Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel (the French audiovisual regulator, CSA herein), has made
available to us the monthly audience and advertising data of 12 major broadcast TV stations in
France from March 2008 to December 2013. The sample is representative of the French TV market:
The total audience share of the 12 stations exceeds 95 percent of the free-broadcast TV market and
79 percent of the whole TV market including pay TV; the total advertising revenue share of the
12 stations exceeds 90 percent of the free-broadcast TV market and 81 percent of the whole TV
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market. The list of the 12 TV stations is provided in Table 1. All 12 TV stations are generalist,
broadcasting a wide range of programs. The incumbent channels have been broadcasting since
1950, while the new channels entered the market in 2005. The three channels involved in the
acquisition (as mentioned in the Introduction) are highlighted in bold.
Table 1: List of TV channels and their ownership since 2010
Channels Nature Media Group membership
Incumbents TF1 private TF1 Group
M6 private M6 Group
FR2 public FTV Group
FR3 public FTV Group
FR5 public FTV Group
New entrants NT1 private TF1 Group
TMC private TF1 Group
W9 private M6 Group
FR4 public FTV Group
D17 private Canal plus Group
D8 private Canal plus Group
Gulli private Lagardère Group
The audience data come originally from Médiamétrie, which builds a measure of audience by
recording the television usage every second by a panel of households equipped with one or more
TV sets in their main residence.6 From these raw data, we derive our monthly measure of audience
as a weighted average of viewers per second in a month.7
The advertising data  more precisely, the gross advertising revenues and the number of ad-
vertising seconds  come from Kantar Media. Using this information, we estimate the monthly
average advertising price per second by dividing each channel's gross advertising revenues by the
number of seconds of advertising in the month. This is the price that the ASHs charge advertisers
in our model.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the main variables in our analysis. The total number of
TV viewers per channel per second is on average equal to 3.84 thousand. A TV channel broadcasts
on average 56 hours (i.e., 0.2 million seconds) of advertising per month. The average advertising
price is 5.96 euros per second. These three main variables are measured at the monthly level for
each channel.
In addition to the above data provided by the CSA, Médiamétrie supplied us with complemen-
tary information on the broadcasting content of the 12 TV stations in our sample. In more detail,
we observe the monthly broadcasting hours of six major genres of TV shows per channel per month
6This panel has been built to account for both the socio-demographic characteristics of households in metropolitan
France and the structure of the television supply. It is made up of nearly 4,300 households, which corresponds to
approximately 10,500 individuals aged 4 and over. In each home, Médiamétrie installs one or more audimeters
(depending on how many pieces of equipment there are) fitted with a remote control with individual keys, which
constantly record all uses of the television set(s) in the household and all the viewing habits of each member of the
household and their guests. (See http://www.mediametrie.fr.)
7In practice, the number of viewers of channel j in month t, yjt used in the model later, is defined as follows.
Médiamétrie measures the number of viewers of channel j at each second s. Assuming there are 30 days in month
t (so in all, 2,592,000 seconds in the month), the monthly average number of viewers of channel j, yjt, is equal to∑2592000
s yjs
2592000
, where yjs denotes the total number of viewers of channel j at second s. In other words, yjt denotes
the average number of viewers per second of channel j in month t.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Number of TV viewers (in thousands) 3.84 4.14 2.86 16.03
Number of seconds of advertising (in millions) 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.44
Advertising price per second (in thousands) 5.96 8.01 0.42 35.95
Note: The total number of observations is 840, which amounts to 70 monthly observations per TV channel.
Source: Médiamétrie & Kantar Media.
during the period of study (i.e., 20082013). Summary statistics on the broadcasting of the six
program genres are provided in Table 3. TV series/movies, culture/science, and entertainment are
the most broadcast genres, which occupy more than 70 percent of the broadcasting time of each TV
station. The broadcasting of news varies significantly from channel to channel: the new entrants
such as TMC, Gulli and D17 do not show any news. Sports and cartoons occupy relatively small
shares of the total broadcasting time of the 12 generalist TV stations in our sample; in particular,
FR5 and TMC do not show sports, while D8 and W9 do not show cartoons.
Table 3: Monthly broadcasting hours of different genres
Genre Unit Level Man Stv. Min. Max
TV Series/Movies hours channel/month 283.85 157.30 16.78 696.00
Culture/Science hours channel/month 153.23 156.77 2.70 711.45
Entertainment hours channel/month 123.41 137.39 0 692.67
News hours channel/month 52.31 53.66 0 214.47
Sports hours channel/month 14.31 19.45 0 166.80
Cartoons hours channel/month 1.30 2.35 0 21.13
Source: Médiamétrie
2.2 Market structure
TV stations could be considered as two-sided market platforms connecting viewers to advertisers.
They provide two services: TV shows to viewers on one side, and advertising slots to advertisers
on the other. While viewers enjoy the news and entertainment content on TV, they receive the
flow of advertising. When TV viewers see the advertisements, this generates an audience for the
advertisers. TV viewers may, however, be sensitive to the amount of advertising, in which case
the advertisers generate externalities for the TV viewers. Advertisers value TV advertising for
its ability to inform and/or persuade viewers of the merits of products or services they have to
commercialize. Therefore, a priori, the more popular a TV channel is among viewers, the more
demanded it is by advertisers. Our empirical analysis below provides evidence on the sign and the
magnitude of these externalities between the two sides of TV stations.
Advertisers buy the advertising slots of TV channels from the ASHs, whose role is to handle
and sell the advertising time available on different TV stations. The ASHs charge advertisers a
price per second of advertising that warrants a certain level of audience. The advertisers' objective
is then to minimize their total advertising costs by combining the advertising slots on several TV
channels in order to achieve a certain overall reach of audience. In other words, the advertisers
practice multi-homing strategies.
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TV programming is decided by the TV channels several months in advance. Based on the
broadcasting content provided by the TV channel, each ASH determines its optimal supply of
advertising slots. The amount of advertising of a broadcast TV station is, however, subject to
two regulation caps enforced by the French law, at the hourly and daily average levels.8 In
Table A1 in Appendix A, we compare the effective amount of advertising to the maximum minutes
of advertisements per month allowed for each TV station (calculated based on the daily average
level of the regulation cap); we note that the observed advertising time of different TV channels is
well below the regulatory ceilings.9,10 The ASHs behave as Cournot-type firms, since they adjust
the amount of advertising according to the quality of the TV program and the sensitivity of viewers
to the amount of advertising. At equilibrium, each ASH's objective is to determine the optimal
amount of advertising in each channel under its management to maximize the sum of its profits
from all of these channels.
Unlike pay TV channels, which charge subscription fees to their viewers, free-broadcast TV
stations only require their viewers to bear the advertising. While the pay TV stations play an
important role in the U.S. TV market, they are much less common in France. Although there were
between 184 and 207 pay TV channels available in the French TV market during the observation
period, neither their total audience share nor their total advertising revenue share exceeds 10
percent.11 In addition, most of the pay TV channels specialize in one theme and target a specific
audience (children, young women, etc.), while the 12 major free-broadcast TV stations included
in our study are generalist TV channels which aim to serve a wide audience. We group all the pay
TV channels into an outside option of our model because the statistics on the audience share of
an individual pay TV channel are not available, due to their negligible share of the market.
2.3 Relation between advertising and TV viewership
If the broadcast TV market is a two-sided market, there are two elements that could support this
view: the relation between the amount of advertising and the number of viewers; and the relation
between the number of viewers and the advertising spending. For an industrial organization to be
considered as a two-sided market, we must identify the externalities between the two sides of the
consumers, which are here the viewers and the advertisers.
As the cross-side externalities between the viewers and advertisers could play a crucial role in
the evaluation of the merger decision that we investigate in this paper, we perform a descriptive
analysis to gain insight into the existence and the sign of those externalities, and to show that
there is sufficient variation in our data to identify the structural parameters that we will estimate
later in the paper.
8The average time per hour per day devoted to advertising must not exceed six minutes for public TV channels,
nine minutes for the incumbent private channels, and 12 minutes during the first seven years of broadcasting for the
new channels launched in 2005. Moreover, the advertising time cannot exceed 12 minutes within any given clock
hour for private TV broadcasters and eight minutes for public TV broadcasters.
9As we use monthly data in this paper, we computed the maximum minutes of advertisements per month allowed
for each TV station from its daily average level of regulation cap imposed by the regulator: The maximum minutes
of advertisements allowed for channel j in month t is equal to the maximum minutes of advertisements per day
allowed for channel j in month t × the number of days in month t.
10Regulatory constraints at the hourly level can be binding during prime time, though our monthly aggregate
data does not allow us to explore this. Crawford et al. (2017) and Zhang (2019) have studied this issue in detail.
11See for instance the publication of CSA: https://www.csa.fr/Informer/Collections-du-CSA/
Panorama-Toutes-les-etudes-liees-a-l-ecosysteme-audiovisuel/Les-chiffres-cles/
Les-chiffres-cles-de-l-audiovisuel-francais-Edition-du-2nd-semestre-2013
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Relation between amount of advertising and viewership
To understand whether the amount of advertising has a significant effect on the viewership of TV
channels, and the direction of such an effect, we regress the number of viewers on the number
of seconds of advertising, controlling for the broadcasting hours of different program genres and
the channel-, month-, and year-fixed effects. The OLS results presented in the second column of
Table 4 indicate that a higher viewership is associated with a higher amount of advertising, which
is counterintuitive.
The number of advertising seconds is likely to be endogenous, however, because the error
term contains unobserved characteristics of channel-time-genre specific program quality, which are
correlated with the amount of advertising. We therefore re-estimate the same equation using BLP
IVs, namely, the sum of broadcasting hours of news and entertainment programs of the competing
channels during the same months. In contrast to the OLS results, we now find a negative correlation
between the amount of advertising and the viewership of a TV station, as shown in the third column
of Table 4.
Table 4: Relation between amount of advertising and viewership
Number of viewers (yjt)
OLS IV
Amount of advertising 0.138*** −0.269*
(0.027) (0.140)
Program characteristics Yes Yes
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
No. observations 840 840
CraggDonald Wald F statistic 10.36
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.298
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
Relation between viewership and advertising spending
Another important element which characterizes the broadcast TV market as a two-sided market
platform is the occurrence of network externalities that viewers generate for advertisers. Intuitively,
advertisers' willingness to pay should be higher for the advertising seconds of a channel which
attracts more viewers. Accordingly, we should expect higher advertising spending on the advert
seconds with more viewers.
To illustrate this, we present a binned scatterplot of the relation between the number of viewers
per second and its corresponding advertising spending, i.e., the per second advert price defined in
Section 2.1, controlling for channel-, month- and year-fixed effects.12 The result is presented in
Figure 1. Note that a higher viewership is associated with higher advertising spending, suggesting
that the TV viewers generate positive network externalities for the advertisers.
3 Demand model
We now present our structural model for the demand of TV viewers and advertisers. We explain
here the motivation behind the choice of our specification. Then, in the next section, we discuss
12We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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Figure 1: Relation between TV viewership and advertising price
the estimation results for these models.
3.1 Viewers' demand
We specify the viewers' demand using a nested-logit model, which classifies the choices of the TV
viewers into g groups (or nests) and an additional group for an outside good. As is well known, one
of the main properties of this model is that choices within the same group are closer substitutes
than choices from different groups (see Berry, 1994). Our categorization of the groups is motivated
by the following considerations.
Our sample includes 12 major broadcast TV stations: five incumbent channels and seven new
entrants. We categorize the incumbent channels and the new entrants into two different groups
to take into account their different brand awareness, type of content, and quality. The seven new
entrants do not enjoy the same market position as the five incumbent channels: The audience
shares of the new channels are remarkably lower than those of the incumbents. (See Table A2 in
Appendix A for detailed statistics.)
Three elements explain this difference. First, the incumbent channels and new entrants do
not have the same brand awareness, simply because they entered the market at different times.
The incumbent channels have been broadcasting since 1950, while the seven new channels entered
the market in 2005. The new entrants also required a new reception technology, which was only
adopted gradually by the French households between 2005 and 2013.
Second, the broadcasting content on the incumbent channels has a different focus and quality
from that on the new channels. Although all of the 12 TV stations in our sample show a wide
range of genres of programs, the incumbent channels devote relatively more time to news and
culture/science, while the new channels show more TV series/movies.13 The incumbent channels
offer better quality of sports events and entertainment programs than the new entrants: Only
the incumbent channels can afford the cost of broadcasting popular sports events such as the
Champions League, the Olympic Games, and expensive live shows such as The Voice.
13See Figure A.1 in Appendix A for the distribution of different genres of program on incumbent and new entrant
channels.
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Third, a French law requires the free-broadcast TV stations to show at least 40 percent of
French audiovisual programs per day. The incumbent channels must fulfill this obligation in the
evening, from 18:00 to 23:00, while the new entrants have the whole day to carry out the same
obligation.
Instead of choosing one of the channels in our sample, viewers can select the outside option
(corresponding to group 0) which consists of either watching one of the remaining free or pay TV
channels (for which we have no individual data due to their very small audience) or engaging in
activities other than watching TV.
The nested logit model allows for the incumbent TV channels to be considered as closer sub-
stitutes for each other than for the new channels. It also allows for the probability that a represen-
tative viewer chooses an incumbent channel to be higher than the probability of choosing a new
channel, which is consistent with their respective audience shares and with the higher reputation
and quality of incumbent channels compared to the new channels.
Formally, in each period t, the indirect utility of consumer i from watching channel j, belonging
to the group g (incumbent, entrant or outside good), is given by:
U ijgt = δjt + ζ
i
jgt, (1)
where δjt denotes the mean utility level of TV viewers from watching channel j or choosing the
outside good at time t and ζijgt denotes the departure of consumer i's preference from the common
utility level.14 We define:
δjt = qjt + αAjt, (2)
where qjt denotes the perceived quality of channel j in period t and Ajt denotes the amount of
advertising. We model the quality by qjt = Xjtβ+ξjt, where ξjt is a random term capturing the un-
observed quality of channel j in period t and Xjt is a matrix of variables including observed content
characteristics, channel-fixed effects, as well as month- and year-fixed effects. The observed content
characteristics are broadcasting hours of TV series/movies, entertainment, news, culture/science,
sports and cartoons, capturing the observable channel-time specific broadcasting quality. Channel
dummies capture the brand awareness of each individual TV station; year dummies capture the
potential changes in policy, fluctuations of the economic climate and the generalization of the
digital TV technology; month dummies capture the seasonality of TV viewing.
We also specify the error term ζijgt in Equation (1), which reflects individual deviations from
the mean valuation, as a weighted sum of two unobserved variables εigt and ε
i
jt given by:
ζijgt = ε
i
gt + (1− σ)εijt. (3)
The term εigt affects the individual i's preferences common to all channels belonging to group g,
and the term (1− σ)εijt affects the individual i's preferences specific to channel j. The two terms
εigt and ε
i
jt are distributed in such a way that the individual preferences have an extreme value
distribution and are allowed to be correlated across channels j. (See MacFadden et al., 1978 and
Williams, 1977.)
The parameters of interest to be estimated are α and σ. The parameter α denotes the mean
preference of TV viewers for advertising: A positive (negative) value of α suggests that viewers
value (disvalue, respectively) advertisements. We let the data decide the sign of α at the estimation
stage. Moreover, a statistically significant α would confirm the two-sided nature of the TV market
and is hence a crucial element of our structural estimation.
14Recall that we observe the monthly average number of viewers per channel per second, computed from the per
second measurement by Médiamétrie. (See footnote 7.) We assume that a viewer chooses one channel to watch in
a given second, but we only observe the average number of viewers per second for each channel in a given month.
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The parameter σ ∈ [0, 1) defines the substitutability of TV channels belonging to the same
group. As σ approaches one, the TV viewers substitute significantly between channels within the
same group g; as σ decreases, the correlation of preferences for channels within the same group
decreases. Typically, σ = 0 signifies that the TV viewers are equally likely to switch between
channels of different categories as between channels in the same group.
Following Berry (1994), the mean utility level for the outside good is normalized to 0, i.e.,
δ0 = 0, and the demand of viewers is specified as:
ln(sjt) = Xjtβ + αAjt + σln(sjt/g) + ln(s0t) + ξjt, (4)
where sjt (respectively, s0t) is the probability that an individual chooses to watch channel j (re-
spectively, to take the outside option) at time t. The probability sjt is decomposed as the product
of two probabilities: the probability sjt/g of watching channel j given that channel j belongs to
group g and the probability sgt that an individual chooses to watch channels of group g. The
difference in brand awareness between incumbents and new entrants implies that the probability
of choosing an incumbent channel is greater than the probability of choosing a new entrant. As
we pass over the representative TV viewers, the choice probabilities sjt, sjt/g, s0t coincide at the
aggregate level with the market share of channel j sjt, the market share of channel j within its
group sjt/g and the market shares of the outside goods s0t, respectively.
If Tt is the market size at time t, and if yjt is the number of TV viewers watching channel j,
the audience share of channel j and its audience share within its group are given by: sjt = yjt/Tt
and sjt|g = sjt
/∑
j∈Cg sjt, respectively. The audience share of the outside good is obtained as
s0t = 1−
∑
j sjt.
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From Equation (4), we write the number of viewers as yjt = sjtTt ≡ yjt(At), where At =
{A1t, . . . , Ajt, . . . , AJt} is the vector of amounts of advertising for each channel. Then, the TV
viewers' demand function to be estimated is given by:
ln sjt − ln s0t = αAjt + σ ln sjt/g +Xjtβ + ξjt. (5)
Identification
Equation (5) entails two identification problems. One concerns the parameter σ. Conceptually,
observing the viewers' switching between channels within the same group (i.e., incumbent, entrant,
or outside channels) over time should allow identifying σ, as it involves changes in the conditional
probabilities of choosing the same group. These variations can be either the result of changes
in the channels' characteristics or the result of changes in the number of channels operating in
the market. There is, however, a potential endogeneity problem if viewers switch from a channel
because of some unobserved changes in the characteristics of the TV channel. In Equation (5),
when ξjt is high, the market share sjt is high, but the conditional market share, s¯jt/g, is also high,
not only because of viewers' switching from channels of the same group but also because of some
viewers that have switched from channels of other categories. For instance, when an incumbent TV
channel j increases the quality of its broadcasting content during period t, it attracts additional
viewers both from other incumbent channels and from the new channels. We do not observe this
change in the quality of channel j, which is captured by ξjt; however, we observe an increase in its
market share sjt and its conditional market share sjt/g. As a consequence, the estimate of σ could
be biased upwards unless sjt/g is properly instrumented for.
Another issue of identification comes from the fact that the market shares of TV channels sjt
and the amounts of advertising Ajt are determined simultaneously. The random term ξjt includes
15In the empirical part, the market size Tt is considered to be the total population of France.
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characteristics of channel j during period t that are unobserved by econometricians but are likely
to be observed by the TV stations. The equilibrium level of advertising Ajt should be high (or
low) if the TV operator anticipates that its viewership sjt will be high (or low). Hence, without
controlling for the Ajt, the estimate of α would be biased upward (or downward, respectively).
We use the following BLP-style instrumental variables to address the endogeneity issue: monthly
broadcasting hours of news and entertainment of all competing channels, as well as monthly broad-
casting hours of news and entertainment of all competing channels in a group (incumbent or en-
trant). Note that the channels which share a common ownership with the instrumented channel
are not considered as competing channels in our IV construction. The validity of the above instru-
ments relies on the timing of the decision about the broadcasting content and about the amount
of advertising. According to experts in the industry, the broadcast TV content is decided about
three months before the broadcasting time. Since the content is chosen simultaneously on differ-
ent TV channels, the choice of a channel cannot depend on the content quality of a competing
channel during the same period. In other words, the instrumental variables, i.e., the broadcasting
hours of news and entertainment of competing channels within the same month, are independent
of the error term, namely, the unobserved quality of the shows of the instrumented TV channel
in Equation (5). Moreover, TV stations communicate their broadcasting content to the public
about two months prior to their actual broadcasting time. The ASHs collect this information, and
determine the optimal amount of advertising of each channel according to the attractiveness of its
content with respect to the content of its competitors. Therefore, the instrumental variables, the
broadcasting hours of different TV shows of competing channels, are correlated with the endoge-
nous variable, namely, the amount of advertising of the instrumented channel Ajt. The TV shows
of the competing channels in a group (incumbent or entrant) can explain the conditional market
shares of each channel in its respective group sjt/g, meaning that this set of instruments, i.e., the
broadcasting hours of different TV shows of competing channels in a group, is correlated with the
endogenous variable, namely, the conditional market shares of each channel in its respective group
sjt/g.
3.2 Advertisers' demand
The literature on two-sided media markets has modelled advertisers' demand by their inverse
demand curve relating the price of advertising to the amount of advertising and size of the audience.
(See, among others, Rysman, 2004; Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Wilbur, 2008; Fan, 2013;
Berry, Eizenberg, and Waldfogel, 2016.) While this approach can obtain the inverse demand
elasticities of advertisers, it does not explicitly model the substitutability or complementarity
between the advertising slots of different TV channels. Since cross-substitution of channels by
advertisers can incentivize the ASHs to increase advertising prices via a merger, ignoring the
substitutability and/or complementarity between the advertising slots of the TV channels could
bias the results of the merger analysis that we carry out below. We propose a demand model
which takes into account the advertisers' multi-homing behavior and allows us to estimate, from
the aggregated advertising data, the cross-elasticities between the advertising slots of different TV
channels.
To reach a wide range of TV viewers, advertisers place the same advertisements on different
TV channels. The advertisers book the amount of advertising Ajt and require from the ASHs a
minimum number of viewers yjt. This activity comes at a cost. Let pjt denote the price per second
of advertising that the ASHs charge to advertisers. A representative advertiser's problem consists
of choosing the vector of amounts of advertising At = (A1t, ..., AJt) that minimizes the total costs
Ct of achieving the desired overall reach of audience, Yt =
∑J
j yjt. The associated cost function of
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the advertiser is defined as:
Ct = C(pt, Yt) =
 minA1t,...,AJt∑
j
pjt ×Ajt|F(A1t, ..., AJt) ≤ Yt
 , (6)
where pt = (p1t, ..., pJt) and F(A1t, ..., AJt) ≤ Yt is the production function of the representative
advertiser.
We assume that this cost function can be approximated by a translog flexible form as:16
lnCt = γ0 + γy lnYt +
1
2
γyy(lnYt)
2 +
J∑
j
γj ln pjt +
1
2
J∑
i
J∑
j
γij(ln pit)(ln pjt)
+
J∑
j
θj(lnYt)(ln pjt) +
J∑
j
ξAjt ln pjt,
(7)
where ξAjt denotes the error term. Taking the derivative of Equation (7) with respect to ln pjt and
applying Shephard's lemma yields the cost share equations for each TV channel j:17
SAjt = γj +
J∑
i
γij(ln pit) + θj(lnYt) + ξ
A
jt (8)
To satisfy the adding-up, homogeneity and symmetry conditions of the duality theory, the param-
eters of the translog cost function must satisfy the following constraints:18
J∑
j
γj = 1 and
J∑
j
γij =
J∑
i
γij =
J∑
j
θj = 0 and γij = γji (9)
Solving the system of Equations (8) yields the vector of advertising prices pjt ≡ pjt(At, Yt). The
own- and cross-price elasticities of the advertiser's demand (EAjj,t, E
A
ji,t) can be derived from the
Allen partial elasticities of substitution (see Berndt and Wood, 1975):
EAjj,t =
∂Aj,tpj,t
∂pj,tAj,t
= γjj/S
A
j,t + S
A
j,t − 1 (10)
EAji,t =
∂Aj,tpi,t
∂pi,tAj,t
= γij/S
A
j,t + S
A
i,t (11)
Identification
We estimate the system of advertising cost share equations, specified by Equations (8), under
the constraints in Equations (9), using Zellner's iterated seemingly unrelated regression method.
To avoid the singularity of the covariance matrix of the advertising cost share system, one share
16The translog cost function is flexible in the sense that it does not impose restrictions on the substitutability or
complementarity between the input factors (Ait and Ajt, ∀i 6= j). (See Berndt, 1991; Christensen et al., 1973.)
17SAjt =
∂ lnCt
∂ ln pjt
=
pjt∂Ct
Ct∂pjt
=
pjtAjt
Ct
.
18Since each cost share is the proportion of the total advertising cost spent on that input, the cost shares of the
different TV stations must sum to one. This condition implies that the intercepts of the cost share equations must
sum to one, while both the row and column coefficients must sum to zero. In addition, imposing the symmetry
γij = γji guarantees the integrability of the demand function of the advertisers. (See Hurwicz and Uzawa, 1971.)
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equation must be omitted in the estimation. We select randomly one channel, channel j, to omit,
but recover its parameters, γj , γij and θj , using the restrictions given by Equations (9).
The error term ξAjt may include the broadcasting quality of channel j in month t, which has an
impact on both Ajt and p1t, ..., pJt. If this is the case, there would be a problem of endogeneity.
We then need instruments for ln p1t, ..., ln pJt to estimate the system of advertising cost share
equations using the three-stage least squares method. We have compared two sets of instruments
for p1t, ..., pJt: the twice-lagged logarithm of the price of advertising (i.e., ln p1t−2, ..., ln pJt−2) and
the broadcasting hours of news and entertainment programs of the competing channels (also used
as instruments for Ajt in the viewers' demand model).
19,20 For each set of instruments, we tested
the difference between the estimates with and without instrumenting for ln pjt using the Hausman
test. The testing results do not reject the null assumption that the difference between the estimates
under the two specifications (with and without IVs) is not systematic. In other words, we obtain
very similar estimates with and without instrumenting for ln pjt; thus ln pjt can be treated as
exogenous in Equations (8).
4 Estimation results
4.1 Viewers' demand
The estimation results for Equation (5) are presented in Table 5. Both the coefficient associated
with the amount of advertising, αˆ, and the one associated with the within-nest shares, σˆ, are
significant at the one percent level. Since αˆ < 0, an increase in the amount of advertising induces
a decrease in the number of viewers of the TV channel. This result suggests that, on average,
TV viewers are adversely sensitive to the amount of advertising. The estimated σˆ is significantly
smaller than 1, indicating that there is competition between the incumbents and the new channels,
although its value suggests that there is significant segmentation between the two groups of TV
channels (incumbents and entrants).
Note that news and cartoons have a statistically significant mean positive effect on the size
of the audience, but entertainment has a statistically significant mean negative effect on the size
of the audience. This latter fact, which looks counterintuitive, can be explained as follows: The
entertainment genre includes many unpopular programs that the TV channels use to fill the broad-
casting slots during working hours and sleeping time; several high-quality shows belonging to this
category are exclusively broadcast by the incumbent channels; their impact on audience size is
captured by the nest parameter and the channel fixed effect. We could not identify any statisti-
cally significant effect of either TV series/movies or culture/science on the audience size, because
the total broadcasting hours of both genres do not vary from one month to another, although their
availability (in terms of broadcasting hours) is very channel specific. In other words, the effects of
TV series/movies and culture/science programs on the audience size of a TV channel are absorbed
19The validity of these two sets of instruments relies on the timing of the decisions about advertising prices and
broadcasting content. A key institutional detail is that the advertising prices p1t, ..., pJt are fixed about one month
after the broadcasting content ξAjt, while the ASHs and advertisers should not have any information about ξ
A
jt three
months before the broadcasting time. First, the twice-lagged prices p1t−2, ..., pJt−2 are independent of the error term
ξAjt, as the p1t−2, ..., pJt−2 are fixed prior to the revelation of ξ
A
jt; the twice-lagged prices p1t−2, ..., pJt−2 are likely to
be correlated with the endogenous variables p1t, ..., pJt, as the same advertisements are often repeated for several
months on the same channel. Second, as the content is chosen simultaneously by the different TV channels, the
broadcasting quality of channel j cannot depend on the quality of the content of the other competing channels during
the same period t (in other words, the error term ξAjt is independent of the second set of IVs); the advertising prices
are fixed about one month after the broadcasting content, which implies that the endogenous variables p1t, ..., pJt
are correlated with the broadcasting quality of the different channels of period t (i.e., the second set of IVs).
20The first stage estimations with each set of IVs are provided in Table A6 and Table A7 in Appendix A.
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by the channel fixed effect in the monthly data. We have identified a positive effect of sports on the
audience size, although the parameter is not significant at usual levels. This is because there is an
important heterogeneity between the different sport events: This genre includes the broadcasting
of the Champions League, the Roland Garros tennis tournament, and the Olympic Games, but
also many small sports events that are scheduled daily between 00:00 and 06:00. We note here
that monthly data are not the best way to study the effects of genre on audience size. TV channels
have a strategy of scheduling different genres at different times of day, but the availability of many
genres (in terms of broadcasting hours) does not vary significantly from one month to another.
However, the broadcasting hours of different program genres are here covariates that we control
for in the viewers' demand model to better identify the disutility of advertising (measured by αˆ)
and the segmentation between the incumbent channels and the new entrants (measured by σˆ).21
Table 5: Estimates of viewers' demand
ln sjt − ln s0t
coeff. (s.e.)
Amount of advertising (α) -0.111*** (0.031)
Within-nest share (σ) 0.636*** (0.192)
TV Series/Movies 0.003 (0.003)
Culture/Science 0.001 (0.004)
News 0.068*** (0.009)
Entertainment -0.255*** (0.078)
Sports 0.011 (0.009)
Cartoons 0.461** (0.111)
Channel FE Yes
Month FE Yes
Year FE Yes
No. observations 840
CraggDonald Wald F statistic 14.665
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.440
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
To validate our choice of instruments, we conducted statistical tests for weak instruments and
overidentification of the IV estimations of Equation (5). The results are presented in the bottom
of Table 5. The StockYogo weak instrument test suggests the instruments are strong, while the
Hansen J statistic does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid at the 10
percent level.
The first stage regressions are presented in Table A3 in Appendix A. The total number of
hours of news and entertainment broadcast by all the competing channels can explain the amount
of advertising on the instrumented channel. News has a mean positive effect on the size of the
audience, while entertainment programs have a mean negative effect on the size of the audience.
21Zhang (2019) provides more detailed comments and more precise estimation of the different genre effects on the
audience size of a TV channel using hourly data.
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(See Table 5.) Accordingly, the amount of advertising of competing channels is higher during
news programs, but lower during entertainment programs. The amount of advertising of the
instrumented channel is higher when it anticipates more advertising by its rivals, due to their
scheduling of more news and/or less entertainment programs. The sum of the broadcasting hours
of news and entertainment programs of the competing channels in a group (incumbent, entrant)
significantly explain the logarithm of the conditional market share, ln(sjt/g). The conditional
market share of a channel decreases with the amount of news broadcast by its close competitors
(i.e., competing channels in the same group), but increases with the amount of entertainment
broadcast by its close competitors. We have also tested whether the estimates in Table 5 are robust
to the choice of instruments, by including additional instrumental variables in the estimation. Such
an experiment does not change significantly the values of the estimates but decreases the associated
CraggDonald Wald F statistics. (See Table A5 in Appendix A for details.)
To determine whether the instruments used in the estimation are helpful in fixing the endo-
geneity bias, we compare the results from the IV estimation with those from OLS in Table A4 in
Appendix A. We observe that the parameter estimates associated with the amount of advertising
and the within-nest share in the viewers' demand function strongly differ under the two types of
estimation. Without controlling for the endogeneity bias, the quantity of advertising reflects the
quality of TV channel and is estimated to have a positive effect on the audience of the channel.
The effect of the disutility of advertising can be isolated from the effect of the quality of the TV
channel only if the endogeneity bias is properly controlled for. Moreover, with the nested-logit
model specification, the value of σˆ should be between 0 and 1. This constraint is not satisfied with
OLS.
The own- and cross-elasticities of the viewers' demand with respect to the amount of advertising
(EVjj,t, E
V
ji,t) follow the classical formula in the nested-logit model. (See, for instance, Verboven,
1996.) Their estimates, averaged by channel over the sample periods, are presented in Table 6.
they suggest a median audience loss of about 8.7 percent in response to a 10 percent increase in
advertising time.22 All the estimates of own-demand elasticities are significant at the 10 percent
significance level. The estimated cross-demand elasticities are very small, suggesting that viewers
substitute between channels to a very limited degree. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
viewers do switch to other channels following an increase in the amount of advertising, although
the estimated substitution effects are very small. This is true notably for channels TF1, NT1
and TMC, which suggests that these three channels do have an incentive to merge their ASHs
in order to internalize the competition between them for the audience. However, given the weak
substitution effects of advertising, we should not expect an important change in the amount of
advertising following the merger of their ASHs.
4.2 Advertisers' demand
The estimates of γij in the cost share Equations (8) are presented in Table 7. All the estimates of
γjj , ∀j are positive and statistically significant.23 Many of the γij , i 6= j are estimated to be close
to zero.
22We find relatively small own-demand elasticities, compared to previous articles using US data. Wilbur (2008)
finds that a 10 percent rise in advertising time causes a median 25 percent audience loss for highly rated TV
networks, and larger percentage audience losses for low-rated networks. Using improved audience measurement,
Wilbur, Goeree and Ridder (2009) find a median audience loss of about 15 percent in response to a 10 percent
increase in advertising time. The difference between our estimates and the findings in Wilbur et al. (2009) could
be explained by the much more intensive TV advertising in the US.
23Note that a positive sign of γjj does not imply positive demand elasticity. (See Equations (10) and (11) in
Section 3.2.)
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Table 6: Viewers' demand elasticities with respect to the amount of advertising
EVjj E
V
ji_SG E
V
ji_DG
Incumbents TF1 −0.120 0.0033 0.00085
(0.074) (0.0023) (0.00024)
FR2 −0.062 0.0011 0.00020
(0.038) (0.0008) (0.00008)
FR3 −0.054 0.0006 0.00017
(0.033) (0.0004) (0.00005)
M6 −0.108 0.0013 0.00033
(0.066) (0.0009) (0.00009)
FR5 −0.036 0.0001 0.00003
(0.022) (0.0001) (0.00001)
New entrants NT1 −0.117 0.0008 0.00006
(0.072) (0.0007) (0.00002)
TMC −0.118 0.0015 0.00011
(0.072) (0.0013) (0.00003)
D8 −0.101 0.0008 0.00006
(0.062) (0.0007) (0.00002)
FR4 −0.041 0.0003 0.00002
(0.025) (0.0002) (0.00001)
Gulli −0.061 0.0005 0.00003
(0.038) (0.0004) (0.00001)
D17 −0.080 0.0003 0.00002
(0.050) (0.0003) (0.00001)
W9 −0.097 0.0014 0.00008
(0.060) (0.0012) (0.00002)
Note: EVji_SG denotes the cross-elasticities between channels within the same group
(incumbents and entrants); EVji_DG denotes the cross-elasticities between channels
of two different groups (incumbents and entrants). Standard errors computed by
delta method are in parentheses.
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Table 7: Cost share input price coefficient estimates
SATF1 S
A
FR2 S
A
FR3 S
A
M6 S
A
FR5 S
A
D8 S
A
NT1 S
A
FR4 S
A
TMC S
A
Gulli S
A
D17 S
A
W9
ln pTF1 0.107 -0.023 -0.009 0.025 -0.002 -0.016 -0.014 -0.003 -0.024 -0.014 0.001 -0.029
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
ln pFR2 -0.023 0.036 0.002 0.012 0.000 -0.008 -0.010 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.003
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
ln pFR3 -0.009 0.002 0.025 -0.012 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.014 0.006 0.003 -0.005
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln pM6 0.025 0.012 -0.012 0.064 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.008 -0.024 -0.009 -0.010
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
ln pFR5 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln pD8 -0.016 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.018 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
ln pNT1 -0.014 -0.010 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.037 -0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.000
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln pFR4 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln pTMC -0.024 -0.004 -0.014 0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.042 -0.005 -0.006 0.008
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
ln pGulli -0.014 0.001 0.006 -0.024 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.057 -0.003 -0.007
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
ln pD17 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.009 0.001 0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 0.019 -0.007
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00)
ln pW9 -0.029 -0.003 -0.005 -0.010 -0.002 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.047
(0.01) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
lnY 0.836 -0.031 -0.079 -0.089 -0.029 -0.171 -0.068 -0.011 -0.075 -0.235 0.046 -0.090
(0.25) (0.07) (0.05) (0.16) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.13) (0.04) (0.09)
Number of observations per equation: 69
Note: Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses.
Using these estimates, we compute the own- and cross-price elasticities of advertisers' demand
for viewers (EAjj,t and E
A
ji,t) according to Equations (10) and (11). The estimates by channel,
averaged over the period of observation, are presented in Table 8. Each cell of this table displays
the percentage change in demand that the row channel benefits from the column channel's change
in its price by one percent. The estimates of own-price elasticities are statistically significant for
all channels. These results suggest that advertisers' demand for viewers is relatively price inelastic
since all cross-price elasticities are smaller than one in absolute value.
Inter-channel substitutability coexists with complementarity. Out of the 132 average cross-
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Table 8: Own- and cross-price elasticities of advertisers' demand
TF1 FR2 FR3 M6 FR5 D8 NT1 FR4 TMC Gulli D17 W9
TF1 −0.30 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.00 −0.00 -0.04 −0.00 -0.06 −0.01 0.02 −0.01
(0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FR2 −0.02 −0.21 0.06 0.46 0.01 -0.14 -0.17 -0.07 −0.04 0.05 0.04 −0.02
(0.16) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)
FR3 0.20 0.10 −0.18 −0.16 0.02 −0.04 0.06 0.13 -0.38 0.21 0.12 −0.10
(0.22) (0.12) (0.10) (0.20) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)
M6 0.59 0.10 −0.02 −0.75 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.09 -0.08 −0.02 0.00
(0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
FR5 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.29 −0.33 -0.21 −0.02 -0.10 0.05 0.13 0.13 -0.26
(0.22) (0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.10) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11)
D8 −0.05 -0.23 −0.04 0.27 -0.04 −0.37 0.04 0.03 −0.04 -0.13 0.25 0.30
(0.17) (0.09) (0.07) (0.17) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07)
NT1 -0.35 -0.28 0.06 0.19 −0.00 0.04 −0.29 0.00 0.31 -0.12 -0.21 0.05
(0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
FR4 −0.16 -0.65 0.83 0.83 -0.11 0.20 0.02 −0.47 0.10 -0.54 -0.14 0.07
(0.27) (0.13) (0.13) (0.26) (0.03) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13)
TMC -0.49 −0.04 -0.24 0.39 0.01 −0.03 0.17 0.01 −0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.21
(0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.13) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Gulli −0.11 0.11 0.28 -0.77 0.03 -0.16 -0.14 -0.11 -0.16 −0.38 −0.09 -0.24
(0.30) (0.14) (0.10) (0.30) (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.02) (0.10) (0.22) (0.08) (0.13)
D17 0.53 0.11 0.19 −0.22 0.04 0.38 -0.30 −0.03 -0.25 −0.11 −0.06 -0.30
(0.24) (0.12) (0.11) (0.24) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.11) (0.10) (0.01) (0.11)
W9 −0.10 −0.02 −0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.21 -0.12 -0.12 −0.05
(0.15) (0.07) (0.06) (0.14) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
Note: Standard errors computed by delta method are in parentheses. Own-price elasticities are in bold.
Negative cross-price elasticities statistically significant at 10% are in italic.
price elasticities, 67 (i.e., 51 percent) indicate that channels are substitutes. However, the precision
of the estimates tends to be greater for complements than for substitutes: While 60 percent of
the negative average cross-price elasticities are statistically significant, this percentage drops to
48 percent for the positive average cross-price elasticities. The magnitude of cross-price effects,
whether they identify substitutes or complements, tends to be limited. The median value of the 67
positive average cross-price elasticities is 0.07 (with a range between 8× 10−4 and 0.83, with only
one value that exceeds 1). The median value of the 62 negative cross-price elasticities is −0.11
(with a range between −0.77 and −3× 10−3).
We note that the advertisers consider channels NT1 and TMC as substitutes, but both as
complements of channel TF1. This demand pattern of the advertisers suggests that a merger
between the ASH of channel TF1 with the ASH of channels NT1 and TMC would not lead to a
significant increase in their advertising prices. If the merged ASH increased the price of advertising
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on channel TF1, the marginal advertisers would not switch to NT1 or TMC but to the other
channels that are substitutes for channel TF1.
5 Merger evaluation
In January 2010, the Autorité de la concurrence (the French competition authority) cleared the
acquisition of two free broadcast TV channels, NT1 and TMC, by the TF1 Group, subject to a
behavioral remedy requiring that channels NT1 and TMC sell their advertising time separately
from the main channel of TF1 Group, namely, channel TF1. In practice, the decision prohibits the
merger between the ASH of channel TF1 and that of channels NT1 and TMC; only the broadcasting
content of the three channels is allowed to be managed jointly following the acquisition.
The competition authority had concluded that the acquisition would have a positive impact
on the broadcasting side, since channels NT1 and TMC could benefit from the large catalog of
programs of TF1 Group (which is due to its partnership with numerous content providers): Having
more channels offering high-quality content could enhance the competition between the different
TV broadcasters for audience.24
The authority was, however, concerned about the potential anti-competitive effects of merging
the ASHs of the three channels, due to the dominant position of TF1 Group in the TV advertising
market. Before the acquisition, the ASH of channel TF1 held a 40 percent market share, while the
ASH of NT1 and TMC held a five percent market share. The merger could simply reinforce the
position of TF1 Group in the advertising market, which would translate into an increase in either
the amount of advertising or its price. To avoid any detrimental effect of the acquisition on the
TV advertising market, the authority decided to impose this behavioral remedy for a period of at
least five years.25
Below, we first provide some reduced-form evidence on the impact of the acquisition on the TV
advertising market. We next explain why it is crucial to account for the interaction between the two
sides of the market by exploiting the strategic decisions of the ASHs. In more detail, we estimate
the changes in broadcasting quality of the three merging channels from our viewers' demand model;
then, we counterfactually simulate the effects of the acquisition in the absence of the two-sided
network externalities between viewers and advertisers, to decompose the direct impact of the
changes in broadcasting quality and the effect of two-sided network externalities on the amounts
and prices of advertising by the merging channels. Finally, to comment on the effectiveness of
the implemented remedy, we counterfactually simulate the advertising market equilibrium for the
case in which the ASH of NT1 and TMC merged with the ASH of channel TF1 following the
acquisition.
5.1 Evidence of the effects of the merger
To get an initial insight into the impact of the acquisition on the amounts and prices of advertising
by the merging channels, we estimate the following regression, in line with Ashenfelter and Hosken
(2010) and Björnerstedt and Verboven (2015):
lnAjt = µ
1
j + µ
2
t + ρjPostAcquisitiont + ηjt;
lnPjt = τ
1
j + τ
2
t + λjPostAcquisitiont + ωjt,
24While NT1 and TMC are growing very fast as new entrants to the market, their catalogs of broadcasting
programs are not as rich as the catalogs of the incumbent channels like TF1.
25The ASHs of the three channels have remained separate after the effective period of the behavioral remedy,
possibly because TF1 Group did not want to encourage increased scrutiny by the competition authority.
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where Ajt denotes the amount of advertising by channel j and Pjt its price during period (month-
year) t; µ1j and τ
1
j denote the channel fixed effect; µ
2
t and τ
2
t denote the month-year time fixed
effect; the variable PostAcquisitiont is equal to 0 from March 2008 to January 2010, and is equal
to 1 from January 2010 to December 2013, for all channels.
As noted by Björnerstedt and Verboven (2015), these regressions can be interpreted as difference-
in-differences estimators, where the difference between the merging firms' ρj (or λj) and the com-
petitors' ρj (λj) measures the effect of the acquisition on the amounts (prices, respectively) of
advertising under the assumption that the acquisition does not have an impact on the competitors'
amounts (prices) of advertising. In practice, however, the acquisition could raise the competitors'
prices as well; then, the difference between the merging firms' ρj (λj) and the competitors' ρj (λj)
could be viewed as a lower bound of the effect of the merger on the amount (price) of advertising
of channel j.
We use our full sample (22 months' pre-acquisition data and 47 months' post-acquisition data)
to estimate the channel-specific treatment effects ρj and λj . The estimation results are presented
in Table 9.26
Table 9: Effects of the merger
Amount of advertising Advertising price
(percent change) (percent change)
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
TF1×Acquisition 29.06*** (0.099) 26.77*** (0.100)
NT1×Acquisition 49.71*** (0.115) 119.44*** (0.174)
TMC ×Acquisition 43.761*** (0.110) 110.60*** (0.167)
Others×Acquisition Yes Yes
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes
Note: The percentage effects on the amount of advertising and price are obtained from a transforma-
tion of the parameters ρj and λj using exp(ρj) − 1 and exp(λj) − 1. Standard errors are computed
using the delta method. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
Our results suggest that the acquisition led to a significant increase in both the amounts and
prices of advertising by the three merging channels. We also notice that the acquisition affected
the two purchased channels more strongly than channel TF1. These results could eventually be
explained by the increase in broadcasting quality of the merging channels following the acquisition.
Intuitively, viewers' demand is less elastic to the amount of advertising during better broadcasting
content, which implies that the ASHs of the merging channels have an incentive to increase their
amount of advertising following the acquisition as a strategic reaction to an increase in their
broadcasting quality: Better programs attract more viewers, which in turn increases advertisers'
26Since the acquisition was announced in January 2010, while the merger of broadcasting services of the three
channels could have taken time, we also re-estimated ρj and λj , excluding the post-acquisition data immediately
following the announcement of the acquisition (from February 2010 to December 2010), i.e., using 22 months' pre-
acquisition data and 36 months' post-acquisition data, as a robustness check. The estimates using this reduced
post-acquisition sample are presented in Table A8 in Appendix A. We obtain very similar results with the two
samples.
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willingness to pay for the advertising slots of these two channels. As we find a stronger affect of the
acquisition on the two purchased channels than on channel TF1, we conjecture that the acquisition
may have been followed by a reallocation of high-quality programs from channel TF1 to the two
purchased channels NT1 and TMC. We estimate the post-acquisition changes in broadcasting
quality of the three channels from our viewers' demand model in Section 5.3 below.
5.2 Market Equilibrium
We now write down the profit maximization problem of ASHs, which we use to perform different
counterfactual simulations. The profit of an ASH depends on the demands of viewers and adver-
tisers and on the feedback loop between the two groups of consumers. Each ASH maximizes the
joint profit from the advertising slots of all the channels under its management. Formally, the
profit function of an ASH Hk, k = {1, ...,K} in month t is given by:
Πkt =
∑
j∈Hk
Πjt =
∑
j∈Hk
(pjt − cjt)Ajt, (12)
where cjt is the marginal cost of commercializing one second of advertising on channel j in month
t for the ASH Hk.
At equilibrium, the amount of advertising is the variable which links both sides of the market:
It has an impact on both the number of viewers and on the advertising prices of the TV channels.
An ASH internalizes the network externalities between viewers and advertisers by choosing the
amount of advertising which maximizes its profits. Using the notation introduced in Section 3.1
where we write down the number of viewers yjt of channel j as a function of the amounts of
advertising of different TV channels At: yjt ≡ yjt(At), and the notation introduced in Section
3.2 where we write down the price of advertising pjt of channel j as a function of the amounts of
advertising of different channels At and of the total number of TV viewers Yt =
∑J
j yjt: pjt ≡
pjt
(
At, Yt
(
y1t(At), ..., yJt(At)
))
, the objective of an ASH Hk at equilibrium can be written as:
max
{Ajt}j∈Hk
∑
j∈Hk
[
pjt
(
At, Yt
(
y1t(At), ..., yJt(At)
))− cjt]Ajt.
Assuming that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the amount of advertising exists, and omitting
the time index t for the sake of clarity, the first-order conditions (FOCs) associated with above
profit maximization problem are:
(pj − cj) +
∑
k∈Hk
Ak( ∂pk
∂Aj
+
∂pk
∂Y
∑
i,∀i
∂Y
∂yi
∂yi
∂Aj
)
 = 0,∀j, (13)
where ∂pk∂Aj measures the impact of the amount of advertising of channel j on the price of advertising
seconds of channel k, ∂pk∂Y
∂Y
∂yi
measures the impact of the number of viewers of channel i on the
price of the advertising seconds of channel k, and ∂yi∂Aj is the impact of the amount of advertising
of channel j on the number of viewers of channel i.
The above FOCs suggest that each ASH Hk trades off between three effects when determining
the amount of advertising Aj of channel j at equilibrium: first, the impact of Aj on the price of
advertising pj of channel j and on the price of advertising of the other channels pk managed by
the same ASH Hk, through the term
∂pk
∂Aj
, ∀j ∈ Hk; second, the impact of Aj on the number of
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viewers of different TV channels yi through the term
∂yi
∂Aj
,∀i; lastly, the impact of the number of
viewers of different TV channels yi,∀i on the price of advertising of each channel pk of the ASH
Hk, through the term
∂pk
∂Y
∂Y
∂yi
, ∀k ∈Hk.
Using the estimated preference parameters on the viewing and advertising sides (α, σ, γj , γij ,
θj), and the observed amounts and prices of advertising (Ajt and pjt), we can solve Equations (13)
for the marginal costs cjt.
In what follows, we make use of Equations (13) and the estimated preference parameters as
well as the estimated marginal costs, to first show the impact of the two-sided network externalities
between viewers and advertisers on the effects of the acquisition exhibited in Section 5.1; then, to
evaluate the effectiveness of the behavioral remedy imposed by the French competition authority.
5.3 The role of two-sided network externalities
This section first presents the equilibrium level of broadcasting quality, prices and amounts of
advertising following the acquisition. We then discuss how the two-sided network externalities
between viewers and advertisers impact the effects of the acquisition at equilibrium. Panel 1 and
Panel 2 of Table 10 summarize the different results discussed in this section.
We estimate the TV channels' broadcasting quality from our nested-logit model of viewers'
demand. Formally, according to the TV viewer's utility function (Equation 1), the mean quality
of channel j at time t can be measured by qjt (Equation 2) and is denoted as q¯jt . The estimated
percentage changes in q¯jt from 2010 to 2013 are presented in the first row of Table 10 for each of
the three channels. We find a clear reallocation of quality from channel TF1 to the two purchased
channels (NT1 and TMC): The quality of both channel NT1 and channel TMC has increased,
while the quality of channel TF1 has decreased. Taken all together, the average quality of the
three merging channels has increased by 16.5%.27,28
Together with the increase in broadcasting quality of NT1 and TMC, we also observe a sig-
nificant increase in their amounts and prices of advertising. (See Panel 1 of Table 10.) We could
explain these rather non-standard effects of acquisition by the joint impact of the changes in broad-
casting quality of the merging channels and the two-sided network externalities between viewers
and advertisers.
We then simulate the consequences of the acquisition if viewers do not get disutility from adver-
tising, to show the role of two-sided network externalities in the observed effect of the acquisition.
Panel 2 of Table 10 presents the results.
The counterfactual simulation is performed according to the algorithm detailed in Appendix
B.1. In the simulation, we keep the broadcasting quality of the different TV channels at the same
level as in the observed equilibrium (with two-sided network externalities), so that the simulated
results are directly comparable to the observed effects of the acquisition.
The equilibrium choices of the amounts of advertising by the 12 TV stations are simulated
simultaneously. Our simulation procedure considers the strategic reactions between different TV
27In practice, both NT1 and TMC got the broadcasting rights to some attractive programs that might have been
scheduled on channel TF1 without the acquisition. For instance, since 2011, NT1 started to broadcast some popular
foreign series, such as True Blood and Falling Skies, and started to offer a new culture program Tous Différents,
which is 100% produced by TF1 Group and has a significant audience; TMC got the live broadcasting rights to the
marriage of Prince Albert II of Monaco with the South African swimmer Charlene Wittstock on 3 July 2011, and
broadcast the movie Bodyguard on 13 February 2012, in tribute to the deceased singer Whitney Houston, due
to the broadcast rights previously acquired by TF1 Group. Both shows generated significant peaks in audience for
TMC.
28In this regard, the decision of the French competition authority may have boosted the competition between
different TV broadcasters in terms of audience, since it may have had a positive effect on the quality of broadcasting
content of the two purchased channels.
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Table 10: Post-acquisition changes
TF1 NT1 TMC TF1 Group average
Panel 1: Observed equilibrium
Estimated broadcasting quality (q¯jt) −15.03% 19.01% 10.39% 16.49%
Amount of advertising (Ajt) 1.56% 19.37% 12.39% 10.76%
Price of advertising (pjt) 1.00% 59.78% 22.86% 5.68%
Panel 2: Simulated equilibrium in the absence of two-sided externalities
Amount of advertising (Ajt) −10.83% −3.09% −2.74% −5.62%
Price of advertising (pjt) 0.94% 60.86% 22.86% 5.61%
Panel 3: Simulated equilibrium in the absence of the behavioral remedy
Amount of advertising (Ajt) 8.44% 18.85% 7.73% 11.49%
Price of advertising (pjt) 1.07% 61.25% 23.03% 5.76%
Note: The percentage changes are taken over the post-acquisition years from 2010 to 2013
channels. For instance, the ASH of channel TF1 acknowledges that its amount of advertising
impacts not only the number of viewers of channel TF1 but also the number of viewers of the other
channels, all of which have an impact on the price of advertising of channel TF1 at equilibrium.
The simulated changes in the amounts and prices of advertising of the three merging channels
from 2010 to 2013 are presented in Panel 2 of Table 10.29 Comparing the simulated acquisition
effects in Panel 2 to the observed acquisition effects in Panel 1, we can draw three conclusions.
First, in the absence of the negative externalities that advertisers generate for viewers, the ASHs
respond to the increase in advertisers' willingness to pay for the advertising slots of the merging
channels (as a result of the increase in their broadcasting quality and therefore their number of
viewers) by restricting the total amount of advertising slots on the merging channels and thereby
increasing their prices. Second, the negative externalities that advertisers generate for viewers
incentivize the ASHs to increase the amount of advertising following an increase in TV channels'
broadcasting quality, as indicated by the difference between the amount of advertising (Ajt) in
Panel 1 and Panel 2. Lastly, the joint effect of the two-sided network externalities and the changes
in the broadcasting quality of the three merging channels is that both the amounts and prices of
advertising of the three merging channels are increased, as presented in Panel 1.
We could explain the above findings using the FOCs derived in Section 5.2, namely, Equa-
tions (13). The broadcasting quality qj of channel j, ∀j, affects the amount of advertising Aj
in two ways: first, via its impact on viewers' demand elasticity with respect to Aj , and second,
through its impact on the flexibility of advertising prices with respect to Aj . Specifically, the
derivatives ∂yi∂Aj in Equations (13) depend on qj according to the nested logit model for viewers'
29Note that the advertising level in a given period should be higher when viewers do not care about the amount
of advertising than when they do. The simulated total amount of advertising is 12.34 percent higher under the
assumption that viewers do not care about the amount of advertising than in the observed equilibrium where viewers
do care. The negative values in the first row of Panel 2 in Table 10 are changes in the amounts of advertising from
2010 to 2013, capturing the effects of the change in broadcasting quality of the merging channels in the absence of
the negative externalities that advertisers generate for viewers.
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demand in Section 3.1; the derivatives ∂pk∂Aj in Equations (13) depend on qj , because the prices of
advertising pk, ∀k, are functions of the number of viewers of different TV channels according to
the model for advertisers' demand in Section 3.2.
Intuitively, improving the broadcasting quality of a TV channel incentivizes its ASH to choose
a higher amount of advertising, as it reduces the TV viewers' demand elasticity with respect to the
amount of advertising of this channel: The value of d
∂yj
∂Aj
/dqj is always negative. However, there
may be an offsetting incentive for the ASH to reduce the amount of advertising but increase its price
instead, due to the increase in the flexibility of the price of advertising with respect to its amount:
The value of d
∂pj
∂Aj
/dqj can be either positive or negative in practice. The first incentive comes
from the negative externalities that the advertisers generate for the viewers. The second incentive
is the direct effect of changes in the broadcasting quality of a TV channel on its amount and price
of advertising (in the absence of two-sided network externalities between viewers and advertisers).
Our post-acquisition data suggest that the joint effect of the two-sided network externalities and
the changes in broadcasting quality of the three merging channels results in an increase in both
the amounts and prices of advertising of the three merging channels at equilibrium.
5.4 Effectiveness of the behavioral remedy
This section aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the decision made by the French competition
authority. In particular, we wish to comment on the effects of the behavioral remedy imposed as a
counterpart to its approval of the acquisition of channels NT1 and TMC by the TF1 Group. Since
our sample covers three years of the post-acquisition period (2010-2013), we observe the realized
market equilibrium under the remedy requiring that the ASH of NT1 and TMC remain separate
from the ASH of channel TF1. One practical way to assess the effectiveness of the implemented
behavioral remedy is to compare the observed market equilibrium with a counterfactual situation
in which one unique ASH determines the amounts of advertising of the three channels in order to
maximize their joint profits from advertising. As we observe the quality adjustment of different TV
channels following the acquisition, our counterfactual simulation (using ex-post data from 2010 to
2013) takes into account the effect of the acquisition on product quality.30
The simulation is performed according to the algorithm detailed in Appendix B.2. To facilitate
the comparison with the observed effects of the acquisition (given in Panel 1 of Table 10), we present
directly the simulated changes from 2010 to 2013 in Panel 3 of Table 10.31
Comparing the numbers presented in Panel 3 to the numbers presented in Panel 1 allows us
to reach some conclusions about the impacts of the behavioral remedy. We note that merging
the ASHs of the three channels has almost no impact on their advertising prices, while their
total amount of advertising increases only slightly. More precisely, merging the ASHs of the three
channels increases their total amounts of advertising by 6.78% and increases their average prices
by 1.41%. This result is not surprising, provided that the substitution effects of the amount of
advertising on the viewers' side are small, and that the advertisers consider the advertising slots
of NT1 and of TMC to be complementary to those of channel TF1. (See the demand elasticities
presented in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2.) It is well known that a merger between complementary
firms should not lead to a significant price increase since it eliminates a pricing externality. (See
Cournot, 1838; Economides and Salop, 1992.) The slight increase in amounts of advertising after
the merger of the ASHs is due to the internalization of viewers' substitution between the three
30The recent literature on horizontal mergers has addressed the issue that these mergers have an impact on
product quality (see Chen and Gayle, 2019).
31We have carefully checked that the simulated amounts of advertising are below the maximum levels imposed
by the regulator.
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channels.
The behavioral remedy was adopted to prevent anti-competitive effects that a common ASH for
the three merging channels could potentially cause in the TV advertising market. The competition
authority worried that merging the ASHs of the three channels might disadvantage the other com-
peting ASHs and the consumers (viewers and advertisers). We now evaluate the welfare effects of
the acquisition and the behavioral remedy in order to draw some conclusions about the effectiveness
of the merger decision. We can evaluate the variation in viewer surplus from our nested-logit model,
as in Small and Rosen (1981): CS_viewers = − 1
α
ln[1 +
∑
g[
∑
j∈g exp(
qjt + αAjt
(1− σ) )]
(1−σ)]. The vari-
ation in advertisers' surplus can be estimated by Ct =
∑
j pjt × Ajt, which measures their total
advertising cost. The profit of an ASHHk is given by Equation (12): Πkt =
∑
j∈Hk (pjt − cjt)Ajt.
The estimated welfare changes following the acquisition (from 2010 to 2013) under the be-
havioral remedy (merging only the broadcasting services of the three channels) and without the
behavioral remedy (merging both the broadcasting services and the ASHs of the three channels)
are presented in Table 11.
Table 11: Welfare changes from 2010 to 2013
Viewers' surplus Total cost of advertisements Total profit (TF1 Group) Total profit (others)
Observed merger under remedy −7.94% 13.26% 4.03% 71.18%
Simulated merger without remedy −8.33% −0.08% 10.13% −3.22%
Note: Results in the first row are computed from the observed equilibrium, results in the second row are computed from the
simulated equilibrium, presented in Panel 3 of Table 10.
The first row of Table 11 presents the welfare effects of the acquisition under the behavioral
remedy, i.e., the welfare effects of merging only the broadcasting services of channels NT1, TMC
and TF1. The changes in viewers' surplus in the first row indicate that the surplus of TV viewers
has decreased following the acquisition. This is, firstly, because the TF1 Group reallocated some
high-quality programs from channel TF1 to the two purchased channels, so the broadcasting quality
of its major channel (which is also the most popular channel of the market) decreased following
the acquisition. In addition, the total amount of advertising increased from 2010 to 2013, which
negatively impacted the surplus of TV viewers as well. The presented change in the total cost
of advertisements suggests that the advertisers' total costs increased from 2010 to 2013. This is
because both the market average amount and price of advertising have increased following the
acquisition.
The second row of Table 11 presents the welfare effects of the acquisition without the behavioral
remedy, i.e., the welfare effects of merging both the broadcasting services and the ASHs of channels
NT1, TMC and TF1. Considering the difference between the results in the second row and the
results in the first row, we can conclude that the remedy did not have a significant positive effect
on the surplus of TV viewers, but significantly increased the total cost for the advertisers. If there
were one common ASH which maximized the joint profits from the advertisement slots of the three
channels, the other non-merging ASHs would have to reduce their amounts of advertising and prices
to attract viewers and advertisers following the acquisition, as strategic reactions to the amount
of advertising and prices chosen by the common ASH of the three merging channels. The total
advertising profits of the ASH of TF1 Group would be higher, while those of the other non-merging
ASHs would be lower than in the case in which two separate ASHs manage the advertising slots of
channels NT1, TMC and TF1 (i.e., the results in the first row of Table 11). Our finding suggests
that the implemented behavioral remedy has benefited the ASHs of TF1 Group's competitors, but
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has disadvantaged advertisers.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the analysis of mergers in two-sided markets by assessing a decision of
the French competition authority, which approved the merger of the broadcasting services of three
TV channels but has de facto prohibited the merger of their ASHs via a behavioral remedy.
To do so, we first build a structural model which accounts for the multi-homing behavior of
advertisers. We then estimate the demands of viewers and advertisers using a comprehensive data
set. This step allows us to confirm that one should consider TV channels as two-sided market
platforms since we show that advertising has significant negative externalities on TV viewers.
Using ex-post data, we evaluate the consequences of the acquisition. We show that the acquisition
had a positive effect on the average broadcasting quality of merging channels; however, blocking
the merger of their ASHs through a behavioral remedy has been ineffective at limiting the increase
in their prices and amounts of advertising.
Based on a counterfactual simulation of the market equilibrium in the absence of the negative
externalities that advertisers generate for viewers, we show how the ASHs respond to the increase
in advertisers' willingness to pay (as a result of the increase in the merging channels' broadcasting
quality and therefore their viewership) by restricting the total amount of advertising slots on the
merging channels and thereby increasing their prices. We further show that the two-sided network
externalities between viewers and advertisers incentivize the ASHs to increase the amounts of
advertising of the merging channels as well (as a result of the increase in their broadcasting quality)
since viewers are less sensitive to the amounts of advertising during programs of better quality.
Regardless of the behavioral remedy aiming at limiting any detrimental effect of the acquisition
on the advertising side of the market, the joint effect of the increase in the broadcasting quality
of the merging channels and the two-sided network externalities between viewers and advertisers
results in an increase in both the amounts and prices of advertising of the merging channels.
To comment on the effectiveness of the behavioral remedy, we counterfactually simulate the
acquisition under the assumption that the merger on the advertising side was also approved. Our
results suggest that the remedy enforced by the French competition authority did not have a
significant positive effect on the surplus of TV viewers but increased advertisers' total cost. We
note, however, that merging the ASHs of the three TV channels involved in the acquisition would
have shifted advertising profits of the non-merging ASHs to the merging ones. On the basis of
European competition law, the French competition authority should have approved the merger of
the ASHs of the three channels, since the consumer surplus remained almost unchanged. However,
in the political debate, a decision about whether to approve this merger could be determined
according to the weights that the people allocate to the different market players. In any case, the
two-sided nature of the market should not be ignored when examining the merger.
Hence, the main lesson of our analysis is that, in the process of designing competition or
regulatory policy for two-sided markets, ignoring the interaction between the two sides of platforms
can result in unexpected outcomes.
This conclusion is drawn from the study of the digital TV industry. Provided more disaggre-
gated data on audience and advertising were available, further investigation to refine this analysis
could be undertaken. We expect our methodology could also be helpful for examining similar
markets, especially those in which the usage of services on one side is free and all the revenues
come from the other side.
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Appendix A: Additional tables and figures
Table A1: Ratio of observed amounts of advertising to authorized ceilings
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Incumbents Channel 1 50.9% 43.5% 53.6% 53.8% 43.3% 44.4%
Channel 2 41.0% 29.9% 38.1% 38.6% 35.6% 39.1%
Channel 3 20.0% 22.1% 28.2% 29.7% 27.6% 27.7%
Channel 4 83.7% 56.9% 64.7% 58.3% 56.4% 70.1%
Channel 5 92.6% 67.7% 73.6% 69.7% 71.6% 75.3%
New Channel 6 23.5% 33.6% 39.6% 43.5% 59.0% 74.7%
entrants Channel 7 34.3% 35.3% 33.2% 30.5% 33.2% 43.4%
Channel 8 33.0% 34.0% 37.8% 49.2% 62.5% 54.9%
Channel 9 19.8% 29.8% 38.0% 35.3% 29.2% 37.6%
Channel 10 18.3% 19.6% 20.2% 24.5% 31.6% 38.4%
Channel 11 36.6% 45.2% 48.7% 52.0% 70.0% 77.5%
Channel 12 41.9% 44.3% 52.0% 50.1% 69.0% 77.9%
Note: The names of TV channels are not reported for confidentiality reasons.
Table A2: Audience shares of incumbent channels and new-entrant channels
Year Channel Audience shares
Mean Std. Dev.
2008 Incumbent 13.2% 0.074
New 1.2% 0.005
2009 Incumbent 12.7% 0.071
New 1.5% 0.006
2010 Incumbent 12.1% 0.067
New 1.7% 0.007
2011 Incumbent 11.6% 0.063
New 2.2% 0.007
2012 Incumbent 11.5% 0.060
New 2.2% 0.007
2013 Incumbent 11.2% 0.060
New 2.2% 0.008
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Figure A.1: Distribution of program genres of incumbents and new entrants
Table A3: First stage estimation of TV viewers' demand
Ajt ln s¯jt/g
Entertainment of all competing channels -0.529*** 0.034***
(0.056) (0.012)
News of all competing channels 0.596*** -0.029
(0.107) (0.024)
Entertainment of competing channels -0.252*** 0.046**
in a group (0.032) (0.023)
News of competing channels in a group 0.197*** -0.022*
(0.049) (0.012)
Broadcasting hours of different programs Yes Yes
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
No. observations 840 840
Note: Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Table A4: OLS versus IV estimation of TV viewers' demand
(OLS) (IV)
ln sjt − ln s0t ln sjt − ln s0t
Amount of advertising (α) 0.052*** -0.111***
(0.008) (0.031)
Within-nest share (σ) 1.025*** 0.636***
(0.038) (0.192)
Broadcasting hours of different programs Yes Yes
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
No. observations 840 840
Note: Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses: ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Table A5: Robustness check for the viewers' demand estimation
Baseline estimation Robustness check
(same IVs as in Table 5) (Additional IVs)
Amount of advertising (α) -0.111*** -0.121***
(0.031) (0.031)
Within-nest share (σ) 0.636*** 0.659***
(0.192) (0.193)
TV Series/Movies 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Culture/Science 0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
News 0.068*** 0.070***
(0.009) (0.009)
Entertainment -0.255*** -0.260***
(0.078) (0.079)
Sports 0.011 0.012
(0.009) (0.009)
Cartoons 0.461** 0.473***
(0.111) (0.113)
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
No. observations 840 840
CraggDonald Wald F statistic 14.665 11.914
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.440 0.303
Note: The second column presents the estimates using monthly broadcasting hours of news and enter-
tainment of all competing channels, as well as monthly broadcasting hours of news and entertainment
of all competing channels in a group (incumbent or entrant). The third column presents the estimates
using one additional set of IVs: monthly broadcasting hours of TV series/movies of all competing chan-
nels; monthly broadcasting hours of TV series/movies of all competing channels in a group (incumbent
or entrant). Including more IVs than were used in Table 6 results in similar estimates but decreases
the CraggDonald Wald F statistics. Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses: ***p <0.01,
**p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Table A6: First stage estimation of advertisers' demand with twice lagged prices as IVs
ln ptTF1 ln p
t
FR2 ln p
t
FR3 ln p
t
M6 ln p
t
FR5 ln p
t
D8 ln p
t
NT1 ln p
t
FR4 ln p
t
TMC ln p
t
Gulli ln p
t
D17 ln p
t
W9
ln pt−2TF1 0.248 0.181 0.501 0.265 0.481 0.328 0.075 -1.245 -0.176 0.329 0.333 -0.134
(0.10) (0.47) (0.55) (0.44) (0.61) (0.38) (0.27) (0.60) (0.28) (0.44) (0.31) (0.45)
ln pt−2FR2 -0.869 -0.935 -1.183 -0.980 -1.525 -0.914 -0.565 -0.379 -0.553 -0.236 -0.481 -0.968
(0.04) (0.41) (0.49) (0.39) (0.54) (0.34) (0.24) (0.53) (0.25) (0.38) (0.27) (0.40)
ln pt−2FR3 0.513 -0.105 0.434 0.252 0.351 0.395 0.221 0.321 0.220 0.198 0.185 0.194
(0.40) (0.41) (0.28) (0.39) (0.53) (0.33) (0.23) (0.53) (0.25) (0.38) (0.27) (0.39)
ln pt−2M6 -0.09 0.445 0.068 0.351 -0.121 -0.019 0.012 0.775 0.312 0.569 -0.005 0.925
(0.44) (0.45) (0.54) (0.23) (0.59) (0.37) (0.26) (0.58) (0.27) (0.42) (0.30) (0.44)
ln pt−2FR5 -0.178 0.014 -0.210 -0.106 0.230 -0.097 -0.150 0.058 -0.234 -0.890 -0.338 -0.324
(0.29) (0.30) (0.35) (0.28) (0.18) (0.24) (0.17) (0.38) (0.18) (0.28) (0.20) (0.29)
ln pt−2D8 -0.285 -0.652 -0.433 -0.289 -0.738 0.569 -0.106 -0.197 0.007 -0.032 -0.107 -0.300
7 (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.18) (0.24) (0.15) (0.11) (0.24) (0.11) (0.17) (0.12) (0.18)
ln pt−2NT1 0.422 0.158 0.085 0.334 0.481 0.339 0.943 0.646 0.196 0.501 1.250 0.231
(0.37) (0.38) (0.45) (0.36) (0.49) (0.31) (0.022) (0.48) (0.23) (0.35) (0.25) (0.36)
ln pt−2FR4 -0.078 -0.140 0.016 -0.012 -0.114 -0.133 -0.051 0.691 -0.009 -0.131 -0.064 -0.170
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
ln pt−2TMC -0.367 -0.340 -0.575 -0.287 -0.523 -0.132 -0.061 -0.888 0.366 -0.829 -0.723 -0.428
(0.43) (0.44) (0.52) (0.42) (0.57) (0.36) (0.25) (0.56) (0.21) (0.41) (0.29) (0.42)
ln pt−2Gulli 0.217 0.239 0.297 0.296 0.128 -0.171 0.107 0.453 0.228 0.384 -0.034 0.264
(0.17) (0.17) (0.20) (0.16) (0.22) (0.14) (0.10) (0.22) (0.10) (0.16) (0.11) (0.17)
ln pt−2D17 0.215 0.351 0.273 0.170 0.449 0.290 0.184 -0.037 0.121 -0.034 0.280 0.350
(0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.22) (0.29) (0.18) (0.13) (0.29) (0.14) (0.21) (0.15) (0.22)
ln pt−2W9 -0.008 0.265 0.158 0.059 0.348 0.044 -0.173 -0.101 -0.072 0.105 0.024 0.304
(0.26) (0.26) (0.31) (0.25) (0.34) (0.21) (0.15) (0.34) (0.16) (0.24) (0.17) (0.15)
lnY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations per equation: 67
Note: Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses.
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Table A7: First stage estimation of advertisers' demand with competitors' broadcasting content as IVs
ln ptTF1 ln p
t
FR2 ln p
t
FR3 ln p
t
M6 ln p
t
FR5 ln p
t
D8 ln p
t
NT1 ln p
t
FR4 ln p
t
TMC ln p
t
Gulli ln p
t
D17 ln p
t
W9
News_TF1 0.148 0.186 0.113 0.066 0.167 -0.041 0.037 -0.040 0.024 -0.021 0.098 0.158
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
News_FR2 0.011 -0.043 -0.013 -0.037 -0.035 0.117 -0.028 -0.050 0.009 0.051 -0.003 -0.025
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
News_FR3 0.045 0.024 -0.057 0.008 0.020 0.188 0.094 -0.037 0.101 -0.014 0.078 0.089
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
News_M6 0.139 0.206 0.112 0.090 0.190 0.039 0.083 -0.044 0.068 0.082 0.100 0.150
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
News_FR5 -0.022 -0.168 0.274 0.068 0.098 0.042 -0.239 0.669 0.178 0.410 -0.604 -0.217
(0.23) (0.27) (0.39) (0.21) (0.31) (0.32) (0.26) (0.61) (0.25) (0.38) (0.32) (0.36)
News_D8 0.047 0.040 0.011 0.006 0.077 0.057 0.017 -0.055 0.011 -0.033 0.020 0.028
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
News_NT1 0.077 0.060 0.029 0.030 0.055 0.180 0.058 0.016 0.076 -0.015 0.077 0.090
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
News_FR4 0.142 0.127 0.299 0.280 0.010 -0.282 0.149 0.576 0.130 0.059 -0.083 0.180
(0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.34) (0.14) (0.22) (0.18) (0.20)
News_TMC 0.079 0.117 0.058 0.035 0.125 0.053 0.039 -0.045 0.015 0.022 0.114 0.060
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
News_Gulli -0.447 -0.462 -0.528 -0.370 -0.590 0.002 -0.017 -0.875 -0.253 0.250 0.258 -0.227
(0.16) (0.19) (0.27) (0.15) (0.21) (0.22) (0.18) (0.42) (0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.25)
News_D17 -0.265 -0.142 -0.345 -0.199 -0.241 -0.216 -0.219 -0.281 -0.311 -0.614 -0.470 -0.274
(0.13) (0.04) (0.22) (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.35) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19) (0.11)
News_W9 0.122 0.142 0.078 0.051 0.214 -0.060 0.079 0.127 -0.003 -0.053 0.073 0.161
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Ent_TF1 0.018 0.041 0.026 0.008 0.041 -0.075 -0.010 -0.057 -0.022 -0.034 -0.030 -0.030
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ent_FR2 -0.015 0.041 -0.013 -0.031 0.028 -0.131 -0.037 -0.074 -0.090 -0.106 -0.022 -0.085
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.022) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Ent_FR3 0.021 0.013 0.045 0.009 0.022 -0.074 -0.051 0.088 -0.004 -0.069 -0.066 -0.047
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Ent_M6 0.028 0.059 0.050 -0.002 0.036 -0.138 -0.029 -0.097 -0.047 -0.025 -0.008 -0.026
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Ent_FR5 -0.122 -0.340 -0.230 0.041 -0.295 0.849 0.214 0.723 0.421 0.404 0.213 0.478
(0.18) (0.22) (0.32) (0.18) (0.03) (0.26) (0.21) (0.50) (0.21) (0.31) (0.26) (0.30)
Ent_D8 -0.037 -0.001 -0.038 -0.031 -0.005 -0.047 -0.009 -0.105 -0.065 -0.027 -0.003 -0.049
(0.02) (0.029) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Ent_NT1 0.042 0.031 0.050 0.022 0.056 -0.111 -0.027 -0.020 -0.059 -0.062 -0.062 -0.100
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Ent_FR4 0.024 0.022 0.009 0.004 0.023 -0.017 -0.024 -0.116 -0.050 -0.093 0.008 -0.037
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Ent_TMC 0.020 0.084 0.054 -0.007 0.060 -0.189 -0.028 0.150 -0.059 -0.054 -0.059 -0.024
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Ent_Gulli -0.012 0.014 0.017 -0.037 0.000 -0.042 -0.026 -0.090 -0.013 -0.062 -0.011 -0.066
(0.03) (0.04) (0.054) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Ent_D17 0.032 0.026 0.017 0.021 0.024 -0.019 -0.015 -0.121 -0.023 0.018 -0.006 -0.029
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ent_W9 0.016 0.038 0.049 0.003 0.027 -0.067 0.024 -0.063 -0.025 -0.038 0.037 -0.031
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
lnY Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations per equation: 69
Note: Standard errors of estimates are in parentheses.
Table A8: Effects of the acquisition on the amounts and prices of advertising (01.201112.2013)
Advert Quantity Advert Price
(percent change) (percent change)
coeff. (s.e.) coeff. (s.e.)
TF1×Acquisition 27.05*** (0.096) 23.83*** (0.096)
NT1×Acquisition 52.60*** (0.116) 134.44*** (0.182)
TMC ×Acquisition 43.74*** (0.109) 115.84*** (0.168)
Others×Acquisition Yes Yes
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month -Year FE Yes Yes
Note: The percentage amount of advertising and price effects are obtained from a transfor-
mation of the parameters ρj and λj using exp(ρj) − 1 and exp(λj) − 1. Standard errors are
computed using the delta method. ***p <0.01, **p <0.05, *p <0.1
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Appendix B.1: Simulating the acquisition under inelastic viewers'
demand
The simulation can be performed using the FOCs derived in Section 5.1, namely, Equation (13).
Assuming that the viewers' demand is inelastic to advertising implies that the term ∂yi∂Aj is equal
to 0, ∀i. Omitting the time index t for the sake of clarity, Equation (13) can be simplified as:
(pj − cj) +
∑
k∈Hk
Ak
∂pk
∂Aj
= 0,∀j. (14)
In more detail, we first set the disutility of advertising to TV viewers, α, to 0 and compute
the resulting viewership of the different TV channels yjt(q¯jt) according to the nested logit model:
yjt =
Tt exp(δjt/(1− σ))
Dσgt[
∑
gD
(1−σ)
gt ]
, where Tt denotes the total population, Dgt =
∑
j∈g exp[δjt/(1 − σ)],
and δjt = q¯jt (q¯jt is estimated as in Section 5.3.) Next, we hold fixed the value of yjt(q¯jt), the
estimated preference parameters (σ, γj , γij , θj), and marginal costs (cjt), but vary Ajt and pjt
until we find their optimal levels at the counterfactual equilibrium. In practice, we can write down
the advertising price pjt of channel j at time t as a function of At = (A1t, ..., AJt): pjt = f(At, Y¯t),
where Y¯t =
∑J
j yjt(q¯jt), according to the advertisers' cost share equations defined by Equation (8).
In other words, Equations (14) can be written as:
F (At, pjt(At, Y¯t)) = 0,∀j. (15)
We numerically search for A∗t which solves Equation (15). The detailed simulation procedure
is as follows:
1. Choose a vector of starting values of At (we use the observed At);
2. Search for pt which satisfies the advertisers' demand:
pjtAjt∑
j
pjtAjt
= γj +
∑J
i γij ln pit + θj(ln Y¯t);
3. Compute F (At, pjt(At, Y¯t));
4. Iterate until F (At, pjt(At, Y¯t)) = 0.
The simulated changes in amounts and prices of advertising of the three merging channels from
2010 to 2013 are presented in Panel 2 of Table 10 above.32
32We have carefully checked that the simulated amounts of advertising are below the maximum levels imposed
by the regulator.
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Appendix B.2: Simulating the merger without the behavioral rem-
edy
The merger simulation is performed using the FOCs described in Section 5.2, namely, Equa-
tion (13). We assume that there is one common ASH for TF1 Group, which maximizes the joint
profits of channels NT1, TMC and TF1. We hold fixed the estimated preference parameters (α,
σ, γjj) and marginal costs (cjt), but vary the numbers of TV viewers yjt, amounts of advertising
Ajt, and prices pjt, until we find their optimal levels at the counterfactual equilibrium. In prac-
tice, we can write down yjt and pjt of channel j at time t as functions of the At = (A1t, ..., AJt):
yjt = f1(At, q¯jt) according to the nested logit model for viewers' demand defined in Equation (5)
and pjt = f2(At, Yt(At)) according to the advertisers' cost share equations given by Equation (8).
In other words, Equations (13) can be written as:
F (At, pjt(At, Yt(At))) = 0,∀j. (16)
We numerically search for A∗t which solves the Equation (16). The detailed simulation proce-
dure is as follows:
1. Guess a vector of starting values of At (we use the observed At in data);
2. Compute yjt(At, q¯jt), ∀jt according to the nested logit model: yjt = Tt exp(δjt/(1− σ))
Dσgt[
∑
gD
(1−σ)
gt ]
, where
Tt denotes the total population, Dgt =
∑
j∈g exp[δjt/(1− σ)], δjt = q¯jt + αAjt;
(q¯jt is estimated as in Section 5.1; we hold its value fixed in the simulation)
3. Compute Yt =
∑J
j yjt(At, q¯jt);
4. Search for pt which satisfies the advertisers' demand:
pjtAjt∑
j
pjtAjt
= γj +
∑J
i γij ln pit + θj(lnYt);
5. Compute F (At, pjt(At, Yt(At)));
6. Iterate until F (At, pjt(At, Yt(At))) = 0.
The simulated changes in amounts and prices of advertising of the three merging channels from
2010 to 2013 are presented in Panel 3 of Table 10 above.33
33We have carefully checked that the simulated amounts of advertising are below the maximum levels imposed
by the regulator.
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